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ABSTRACT 
We explore whether managers of unionized firms tend to reduce reported earnings by reporting 
goodwill impairment losses for a unique group of firms experiencing mergers and acquisitions. 
We hypothesize that the existence and strength of labor unions are positively linked to the 
likelihood, frequency, and amount of goodwill impairment. We document that the likelihood of 
goodwill impairment is positively linked to labor unions, suggesting that managers facing strong 
unions are more likely to recognize goodwill impairment. Further, we document that the 
frequency and amount of goodwill impairment are larger for unionized firms, suggesting that 
strong unions promote managerial incentives to recognize goodwill impairment losses more 
frequently and to a larger extent.  




Labor Unions and Goodwill Impairment  
1. Introduction 
The extant literature on goodwill impairment documents that managers of mergers and 
acquisitions firms opportunistically use accounting discretion in SFAS No. 142 to manage 
earnings. Managers tend to delay goodwill impairment to inflate stock prices (Li and Sloan 2017), 
avoid debt covenant violations (Beatty and Weber 2006; Zang 2008; Ramanna and Watts 2012), 
maximize their earnings-based compensations (Beatty and Weber 2006; Darrough, Guler, and 
Wang 2014; Filip, Jeanjean, and Paugam 2015), protect their reputations (Brochet and Welch 
2011; Ramana and Watts 2012), or avoid stock exchange delisting (Beatty and Weber 2006). 
While most prior research on accounting for goodwill impairment focuses either on capital-
market-related incentives or managerial compensation incentives, we have limited knowledge on 
the relations between labor unions and goodwill impairment decisions. We aim, in this study, to 
widen this knowledge by exploring the impact of labor unions on managers’ goodwill impairment 
decisions. We are not aware of any empirical study examining how labor unions affect managers’ 
goodwill impairment decisions.  
Prior studies that examine the rent-extraction theory of labor unions extensively document 
that managers of unionized firms usually take strategic actions to curtail employees’ profit-sharing 
demands. Managers of unionized firms tend to understate profits (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1991; 
D’Souza, Jacob, and Ramesh 2001), cut dividends (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1991), issue more 
debts (Bronars and Deere 1991; Matsa 2010), miss analysts’ earnings forecasts (Bova 2013), 
increase information opacity (Hilary 2006), decrease disclosure frequency (Chung, Lee, Lee, and 
Sohn 2016), or strategically use accounting methods (Bowen, DuCharme, and Shores 1995; 




Following the literature that examines the effect of labor unions on firms’ accounting 
practices, we posit that unionized firms are more likely to recognize goodwill impairment losses 
to send negative signals to their employees. We also predict that managers of unionized firms tend 
to recognize goodwill impairment more often to improve their bargaining positions. Finally, we 
predict that union strength triggers managerial incentives to report larger goodwill impairment 
losses to minimize the rents that can be extracted by labor unions.   
To test our hypotheses about the effect of union strength on various goodwill impairment 
characteristics we describe above, we develop our initial sample consisting of all U.S. Compustat 
firms with a goodwill balance from 2007 to 2016. After removing observations with missing data, 
our final sample contains 7,979 observations. Following the literature, we employ two measures 
of labor unions. Following Hilary (2006), our first measure is computed by multiplying industry-
level unionization rates by firm-level labor intensity. Following Hamm, Jung, and Lee (2018), the 
second measure is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s employees are unionized or 
represented by a collective agreement.  
We employ three proxies for goodwill impairment. The first proxy is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a firm recognizes goodwill impairment losses. This widely accepted measure 
indicates the likelihood of goodwill impairment (e.g., Glaum, Landsman, and Wyrwa 2018; 
Golden, Sun and Zhang 2018). Our second proxy is the frequency of goodwill impairment losses, 
measured as the number of times a firm recognizes impairment losses during our sample period. 
Our last proxy for goodwill impairment losses is the ratio of goodwill impairment losses to 
beginning of year total assets, capturing the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses (e.g., 




In accordance with our hypotheses, we document significantly positive relations between 
the three proxies of goodwill impairment and our two measures of labor unions, indicating that 
managers of unionized firms are more likely to recognize goodwill impairment, and if they 
recognize it, they do so more frequently and to a larger extent. These results suggest that managers 
facing strong labor unions use goodwill impairment losses to decrease reported earnings and hence 
increase their bargaining power.  
We perform various robustness and sensitivity tests to corroborate our main findings. There 
is a possibility that our findings can be affected by some unobservable firm characteristics which 
positively influence both labor unions and goodwill impairment. For example, mature firms and 
firms with less growth are more likely to have organized labor (e.g., Liberty and Zimmerman 1986; 
Chung et al 2016; Hamm et al. 2018). Due to their low growth opportunities, these same firms 
may need to report goodwill impairment, thus driving the positive relations between labor unions 
and goodwill impairment. To mitigate this concern, we implement the following three tests. First, 
to directly address the above concern, we partition our sample based on the two firm 
characteristics—firm age and growth opportunities. We find the positive relationship between 
labor unions and goodwill impairment variables prevails across all sub-samples, indicating that 
our results are not concentrated in old firms or firms with lower growth opportunities. This result 
suggests that our findings are unlikely to be driven by mature firms or firms with lower growth 
opportunities. 
Second, to further mitigate the endogeneity concern, we also perform two-stage least 
squares regressions. We employ the percentage of female employees as an instrument in the first 
stage. While prior research finds the percentage of female employees tends to be negatively 




percentage of female employees directly affects managers’ decision to recognize goodwill 
impairment. (e.g., Chung et al. 2016; Chen, Tong, Wang, and Zhang 2019). In the second stage, 
we continue to document positive relations between labor unions and goodwill impairment 
variables, suggesting that our results are robust to the endogeneity concern.  
Third, following Aobdia and Cheng (2018), we divide our sample into unionized firms and 
non-unionized firms in highly unionized industries and compare our measures of goodwill 
impairment between the two sub-samples. While this sample selection might limit the analysis to 
a smaller sample as in Aobdia and Cheng (2018), this identification strategy would be powerful 
since non‐unionized firms existing in highly unionized industries are a good within industry 
control. Within a sample of firms in highly unionized industries, unionized firms are those whose 
employees are unionized or represented by a collective agreement, while non-unionized firms are 
firms whose employees are not unionized nor represented by a collective agreement in a specific 
year. In line with our main results, we document that the likelihood, frequency, and amount of 
goodwill impairment losses are substantially higher for a group of unionized firms than for a group 
of non-unionized firms in highly unionized industries.  
Labor union literature documents that managers use various accounting and non-
accounting strategies to strengthen their bargaining power. For instance, managers are motivated 
to hold lower levels of cash (Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina 2009) and higher levels of 
inventory (Hamm, Jung, Lee, and Yang 2020), maintain higher leverage (Matsa 2010), and report 
strategically (Bova 2013; Chung et al. 2016; Hamm et al. 2018). Since goodwill impairment 
recognition is one of the accounting strategies that can be used to suppress labor unions’ rent 
extraction incentives, we examine how the availability of other non-accounting strategies such as 




We anticipate that managers tend to choose the goodwill impairment option when the adoption of 
other non-accounting strategies is less effective or not feasible. Consistent with our predictions, 
the positive relationships between labor unions and goodwill impairment measures are more 
pronounced when cash holdings are higher and inventory holdings and leverage are lower.  
Further, we consider the possibility that the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 might drive 
our results since all firms in the economy may have recognized larger amounts of goodwill 
impairment losses as a big bath strategy during that period. To rule out this possibility, we partition 
our sample into financial crisis and non-financial crisis periods and run our main regressions to 
both sub-samples. We find the positive relations between unions and goodwill impairment 
variables persist in both periods, suggesting that the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 does 
not drive our main results. Also, we check the sensitivity of our results using a third measure of 
labor unions. We employ state-level unionization rates as additional proxy since the literature 
suggests that labor union strength is also affected by its location (Krol and Svorny 2007). Our 
findings are robust to this measure of labor unions based on state-level unionization.  
There is also a concern that our findings might be driven by the increased discretion 
provided by the Accounting Standard Update (ASU) 2011-08 in September 2011. To mitigate this 
concern, we estimate our main regressions after dividing our sample into two sub-periods: pre and 
post ASU 2011-08. We find that positive relations between unions and goodwill impairment 
variables exist in both periods, suggesting that ASU 2011-08 is not driving our findings. Lastly, to 
mitigate the concern that our findings may be affected by firms with market indications of goodwill 
impairment—firms that should recognize goodwill impairment—we identify firms that are less 
likely to recognize impairment losses if the difference between the market and book value of equity 




such firms, indicating that managers of unionized firms tend to recognize impairment losses, to 
decrease reported earnings, and to gain bargaining advantage even when there is no need to 
recognize goodwill impairment.  
We contribute to the literature on earnings management when firms face strong labor 
unions. Prior studies in this literature generally offer mixed evidence (Hamm et al. 2018). For 
example, in their examination of 105 unionized firms from 1968 to 1981, Liberty and Zimmerman 
(1986) could not document any earnings-reducing manipulations in the periods before union 
negotiations. On the contrary, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991) document income-decreasing 
behavior in their sample, and Bova (2013) finds that managers facing strong unions are more likely 
to miss analysts’ forecasts. Our study is distinctive because we examine a unique set of firms that 
have experienced mergers and acquisitions and establish how such firms utilize accounting policy 
related to goodwill impairment to exhibit downwardly managed earnings. We find empirical 
evidence that both the existence and strength of labor unions significantly affect managers’ 
goodwill impairment decisions.  
In addition, we contribute to the goodwill literature by documenting that labor unions, an 
important class of stakeholders other than capital market participants, are also an important 
determinant of managers’ goodwill impairment decisions. Further, we contribute to the research 
that offers evidence on the opportunistic acceleration of goodwill impairment either to take a big 
bath to maximize future income (Elliott and Shaw 1988; Ramanna and Watts 2012) or to mitigate 
agency concerns by underreporting earnings when earnings are unexpectedly high (Choi and Nam 
2020). Lastly, to our knowledge, we are the first to document that managers consider both 
accounting and non-accounting strategies to increase bargaining power in labor negotiations. We 




when non-accounting strategies such as reducing cash holdings and increasing the levels of 
inventory and leverage are not available to managers.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review related 
literature and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample, variables, and research 
design. Section 4 reports descriptive statistics and main results. Section 5 illustrates results of 
additional analyses and sensitivity tests. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Prior Literature and hypotheses Development 
2.1. Literature on goodwill impairment 
In a fast-changing business world, mergers and acquisitions have become a worldwide 
phenomenon. Firms have been actively involved in mergers and acquisitions not only to stay in 
competition but also to expand product portfolios, enter new markets, access new resources, or 
acquire new technologies to be able to grow on a global scale. In a comprehensive survey of over 
700 mergers and acquisitions transactions from 13 major industries, Ernst and Young (2009) find 
that reported goodwill represents 47% of the value of an acquired firm, highlighting the significant 
importance of goodwill in firm valuation. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of mergers and 
acquisitions in the U.S. since inception in 1985.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
A significant body of accounting research on goodwill impairment documents that 
managers exploit discretion in goodwill accounting to avoid, delay, accelerate, or misstate the 
magnitude of impairment losses. For instance, Beatty and Weber (2006) document that managers 
avoid goodwill impairment if a firm has income-based bonus plans, exchange delisting incentives, 
or stringent debt covenants. Ramanna and Watts (2012) find that managers of firms with market 




Zang (2008) finds that top management strategically understates the amount of goodwill 
impairment losses to avoid debt-covenant violations. He also documents big bath behaviors by 
newly appointed managers so that they can report higher earnings in the future. Similarly, Brochet 
and Welch (2011) document that new CEOs opportunistically overstate goodwill impairment 
write-offs in the early years of their appointment. Finally, Li and Sloan (2017) find that managers 
delay reporting goodwill impairments to boost firms’ earnings and stock prices. In sum, the 
literature on goodwill impairment recognition generally provides evidence that managers 
opportunistically use goodwill impairment to serve various purposes. We extend this line of 
research by examining how managers facing strong labor unions use the recognition of goodwill 
impairment to influence unionized employees’ perception on firm performance.  
2.2. Literature on labor unions 
The labor economics literature disagrees on the best model to represent the objectives of 
labor unions. Some argue that labor unions seek to maximize the wage bill while others model 
unions’ objectives in a manner similar to an individual’s utility function: trading off rent 
maximization against employment for union members (Hirsch and Addison 1986). Nonetheless, 
both models lead to the conclusion that labor unions extract rents either through demand of higher 
wages or employing unneeded workers. Consequently, empirical research continues to examine 
how managers take strategic actions to protect shareholders from unions’ rent seeking behaviors. 
Klasa et al. (2009) document that managers of unionized firms tend to maintain lower levels of 
cash holdings to shield corporate income from unions’ profit-sharing demands. Hamm et al. (2020) 
document that managers facing strong unions tend to hold higher levels of inventory to maintain 
bargaining power in labor negotiations. Bronars and Deere (1991) and Matsa (2010) document 




employees. Likewise, Bowen et al. (1995) and D’Souza et al. (2001) document that managers of 
unionized firms strategically choose accounting methods to reduce current net income to 
strengthen managers’ position against labor unions.  
Hilary (2006) finds that firms with strong unions exhibit greater levels of information 
asymmetry to strengthen their bargaining power. Chung et al. (2016) provide corroborating 
evidence that unionized firms hide good news during union negotiations and release it afterward. 
Bova (2013) documents that unionized firms intentionally signal negative outlooks by strategically 
missing stock analysts’ earnings forecasts to reduce unions’ bargaining power over managers. 
Finally, Hamm et al. (2018) document that highly unionized firms tend to balance between 
sheltering firm resources and catering to employees’ need for job security by smoothing earnings. 
Overall, the literature provides evidence that managers strategically use accounting discretions, 
including accounting policy choices, to engage in income-reducing strategies in the presence of 
strong labor unions.  
2.3. Hypotheses 
Building on the above arguments that rent-extracting pressures by unionized employees 
impose significant costs on management and firms, we posit that managers facing strong unions 
tend to recognize goodwill impairment more often, with the aim of underreporting current income 
and thereby avoiding or minimizing employees’ profit-sharing demands. Similarly, we argue that 
unionized firms tend to report goodwill impairment more frequently and to a larger extent. Thus, 
we further posit that the frequency and amount of impairment losses are a function of labor union 
strength. This leads to our hypotheses as follows:  
Hypothesis 1a: The likelihood of goodwill impairment is positively related to the existence 
and strength of labor unions. 
Hypothesis 1b: The frequency of goodwill impairment is positively related to the existence 




Hypothesis 1c: The magnitude of goodwill impairment loss is positively related to the 
existence and strength of labor.  
 
3. Sample, variables, and research design 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample includes all U.S. firm-years with a goodwill balance from 2007 to 2016 in 
Compustat. Our sample period of 2007-2016 is designed to cover five years before and five years 
after the issuance of the Accounting Standards Update 2011-08 in September 2011. We obtain 
data to create our main variables, including the strength of labor unions, from various data sources 
such as the Union Membership and Coverage Database1, Compustat, Execucomp, IBES, CRSP 
and Thomson Reuters’ institutional holding database. We exclude all observations that have 
missing values for any firm-level managerial incentives, governance and monitoring, or market-
based characteristics. We winsorize all continuous variables at their 1st and 99th percentiles to 
reduce the impact of extreme values on our results. Our final sample consists of 7,979 observations, 
of which 7,006 firm-years are without impairment losses (labeled as non-impairment sample) and 
973 firm-years have goodwill impairment losses (labeled as impairment sample). 
3.2. Goodwill impairment measures  
We construct three measures related to managers’ choices on goodwill impairment. The 
first measure, GWI, is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm recognizes goodwill impairment 
losses in a specific year. This measure captures the likelihood of goodwill impairment. The second 
measure, GWI_FREQ, is the frequency of goodwill impairment during our sample period. Our 
 




third measure, GWI_LOSS, indicates the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses, measured as 
the amount of goodwill impairment loss divided by beginning of year total assets.2  
3.3. Labor union measures  
Following Hilary (2006) and Hamm et al. (2018), we use two measures of labor unions. 
First, we measure firm-level union strength, UNION, by multiplying firm-level labor intensity by 
industry-level unionization rates. We calculate labor intensity by dividing the number of 
employees in a firm by total assets. We obtain data on industry-level unionization rates from the 
Union Membership and Coverage Database. This measure assumes that the firm-level strength of 
a labor union is affected by both industry-level unionization rates and its influence on employees 
in the firm. For example, even when an industry is heavily unionized, if a firm is less labor-
intensive (i.e., number of employees is small), the effect of industry-level unionization on 
managers’ behavior will not be significant (Hilary 2006). 
Second, following Hamm et al. (2018), we construct UNION_IND, an indicator variable 
capturing the existence of labor unions at the firm level. Specifically, UNION_IND equals one if 
the employees of a firm are unionized or represented by a collective bargaining agreement. First, 
we hand-collect the 10-K filings from 2007 to 2016 for all our sample firms. Then we manually 
search all 10-Ks for the following keywords: union, labor union, labor/employee/worker 
organization, labor/employee/worker agreement, collective(ly) bargaining, collective agreement, 
collective labor agreement, or collective arrangement to identify whether a firm’s employees are 
unionized or represented by a collective bargaining agreement. Such information is usually 
available in the “Employees” section of Item 1.  
 
 
2 Following Li and Sloan (2017), we set missing values for goodwill impairment (GDWLIP) equal to zero if a firm 




3.4. Empirical model 
To test our research question of whether labor unions affect goodwill impairment variables, 
we estimate the following model:  
𝐺𝑊𝐼𝑖,𝑡(𝐺𝑊𝐼_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝑊𝐼_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡)
= 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡(or 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡)  + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐺𝑊/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆_𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽10𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽13𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽15𝑆𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐵𝐴𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽17𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽18𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁_𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑡 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅
+  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
             
where our dependent variables are GWI, GWI_FREQ, and GWI_LOSS, indicating the likelihood, 
frequency, and amount of goodwill impairment, respectively. The variables of our interest are 
UNION and UNION_IND, indicating the strength and the existence of labor unions, respectively. 
All the control variables are defined as below. Positive coefficients of UNION and UNION_IND 
in the regression support our hypotheses.  
3.5. Control variables 
Following prior literature on goodwill impairment, we include various control variables 
that we expect to affect goodwill impairment decisions in our main regressions. First, we include 
a set of firm-level controls used in previous research (Francis, Hanna, and Vincent 1996; Ramanna 
and Watts 2012; Glaum et al. 2018). These include ROA, measured as income before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets; SIZE, computed as the natural logarithm of total assets; MTB, 
calculated as the ratio of market to book values of equity; GW/TA, measured as the ratio of 
goodwill to total assets; SEGMENTS, computed by counting the number of segments; 
YEARS_IMP, measured as the number of consecutive years with goodwill impairment in previous 




control for debt contracting incentives, LEVERAGE, calculated by dividing total liabilities by total 
assets. Francis et al. (1996) and Beatty and Webber (2006) document that managers are more likely 
to recognize impairment losses if they have reported goodwill impairment in prior years. Ramana 
and Watts (2012) document that the higher the proportion of goodwill to total assets, the greater 
the likelihood that goodwill impairment will be recognized. They also document that firms with a 
greater number of segments have more flexibility in allocating goodwill. Finally, Riedl (2004) and 
Beatty and Weber (2006) suggest that debt contracting significantly impacts firms’ decisions on 
goodwill impairment.  
We also include a set of monitoring and governance controls that prior studies indicate play 
an important role in goodwill impairment decisions (e.g., Golden, Sun and Zhang 2018; Glaum et 
al. 2018). The first, AUDIT, is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is audited by a Big 4 
auditor. The second, FOLLOW, is the average number of stock analysts following a firm for a 
fiscal year. The third, INST_OWN, is the ratio of equity shares held by institutional investors. 
Following Glaum et al. (2018), we include several variables to control for managerial 
incentives to manipulate goodwill impairment. The first is CEO compensation, COMP, measured 
as the ratio of the CEO’s variable income to total income. Beatty and Weber (2006) and Ramana 
and Watts (2012) provide evidence that managers tend to avoid or delay impairment losses when 
managerial compensations depend on current firm performance. Thus, we predict a negative 
relationship between goodwill impairment losses and COMP. The second variable is CEO tenure, 
TENURE, calculated as the number of years since the executive became a CEO. Francis et al. 
(1996) and Riedl (2004) find that a new CEO is more likely to report impairment losses in the first 
year of appointment. Therefore, we anticipate a negative link between impairment losses and 




one if a firm reports profits and has a change in income that is positive and greater than the median 
of firms with a positive change (Glaum et al. 2018). Prior research documents that senior 
executives tend to undertake income-decreasing accounting practices when earnings are 
abnormally high to avoid high expectations of future earnings (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 
2005). Therefore, we predict a positive relation between goodwill impairment and SMOOTH. The 
last variable is big bath, BATH, measured as an indicator variable equal to one if a firm reports 
loss and has a change in income that is negative and less than the median of firms with a negative 
change. Healy (1985) documents that firms are more likely to accelerate loss recognition and take 
a big bath if they suffer from abnormally large losses. Likewise, we predict a positive relation 
between impairment losses and BATH.  
Finally, to control for economic determinants of goodwill impairment losses, we include 
both RETURN, current year stock returns, and RETURN_LAG, the previous year’s stock returns. 
Glaum et al. (2018) document that goodwill impairment decisions are related to both current and 
prior-year stock returns. Lastly, industry and year indicator variables are included to capture 
variations in goodwill impairment across industries and over time, respectively. The complete list 
of the variables is in Appendix 1. 
[Insert Appendix 1 about here] 
4.  Descriptive Statistics and Main Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample distribution by year for the goodwill impairment 
sample and full sample. The goodwill impairment sample shows that year 2008 has the highest 
number of goodwill impairments (the number of observations = 197 and 20.25% of observations 




impairment. These findings are consistent with Darrough, Guler, and Wang (2014) and Golden et 
al. (2018) who find a similar pattern in 2008. Except for 2008 and 2009 (33.41% of observations 
in the impairment sample), the number of observations in the goodwill impairment sample for 
other years is evenly distributed. Thus, it is plausible that our results are driven by observations in 
2008 and 2009. To mitigate this concern, we perform our main analysis after dividing the sample 
into two sub-periods: financial crisis period and non-financial crisis period. Panel B of Table 1 
illustrates our sample distribution by the two-digit industry codes. There are 4,031 firm-year 
observations in the manufacturing industry (NAICS 31-33) in the full sample (obs. = 7,979). The 
most heavily represented industries in the impairment sample (obs. = 973) are also the 
manufacturing industry with 507 goodwill impairments followed by the finance and insurance 
industry with 70 firm-year observations.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 exhibits descriptive statistics for all research variables in our model. We show 
statistics separately for the impairment sample (obs. = 973), non-impairment sample (obs. = 
7,006), and full sample (obs. = 9,979), respectively. We also report mean differences between the 
impairment and non-impairment samples and p-values from the t-test and Mann-Whitney test, 
respectively. The statistics outlined in Table 2 reveal that firms with goodwill impairment tend to 
have stronger labor unions (UNION and UNION_IND). In line with our hypothesis that unionized 
firms are more likely to recognize goodwill impairment, both mean and median values of UNION 
are substantially higher in the impairment sample than those in the non-impairment sample. Our 
inferences are similar when using UNION_IND instead of UNION. Again, both mean and median 





We also document that firms in the impairment sample tend to have lower profitability 
(ROA), larger size (SIZE), lower market to book ratios (MTB), larger number of segments 
(SEGMENTS), larger number of consecutive years with impairment losses before the current year 
(YEARS_IMP), higher risk (RISK), higher leverage (LEVERAGE), fewer analysts following 
(FOLLOW), lower percentage of institutional ownership (INST_OWN), lower executive 
compensation (COMP), less positive income (SMOOTH), more negative income (BATH), shorter 
tenure (TENURE), and less current and previous market returns (RETURN and RETURN_LAG, 
respectively). These differences between impairment and non-impairment samples are consistent 
with the prior literature and our predictions. For instance, firms tend to report goodwill impairment 
losses when their performance (ROA and RETURN) and growth opportunities (MTB) are low. 
These results also imply that firms with poor performance may use impairment losses as a big-
bath strategy. Lastly, all the significant differences between the two samples for control variables 
emphasize the need to control for such variables in testing our hypotheses.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 exhibits the Spearman and Pearson correlations for selected variables. The 
correlation coefficients show that the two measures of labor unions UNION and UNION_IND are 
positively and significantly correlated. Specifically, Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients 
between the two measures are 0.482 and 0.361, respectively, suggesting that two measures are 
capturing a similar construct of labor union strength. More importantly, we document that the two 
measures of labor unions are significantly and positively correlated with the three goodwill 
impairment measures, GWI, GWI_FREQ, and GWI_LOSS, preliminarily supporting our 
hypotheses. Furthermore, the associations between union variables and our control variables are 




between labor union variables and LEVERAGE, indicating that unionized firms tend to have more 
leverage to increase bargaining positions in union negotiations. We also document that both union 
variables exhibit a significantly negative correlation with executive compensation (COMP). In line 
with the prior literature (e.g., Gomez and Konstantinos 2006; Huang, Jiang, Lie, and Que 2017), 
this result suggests that strong labor unions play a role in reducing executive compensation. 
Further, we find that goodwill impairment variables exhibit significant correlations with other firm 
characteristic variables with predicted signs. Those correlations are generally in line with our 
inferences obtained from the results in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2. Main results 
Panel A of Table 4 illustrates the results from the logistic regression of our model when 
the dependent variable is GWI, the likelihood of goodwill impairment. Consistent with our 
prediction, both UNION and UNION_IND have significant and positive relationships with the 
likelihood of goodwill impairment (coefficient = 3.071; z-statistic = 2.977; p-value = 0.003) and 
(coefficient = 0.651; z-statistic = 6.027; p-value = 0.000), respectively. Thus, managers of firms 
with strong (weak) unions are more (less) likely to recognize goodwill impairment during our 
sample period. The coefficients on control variables are in line with our predictions. The results 
indicate that the likelihood of goodwill impairment is substantially higher for less profitable firms 
(ROA), larger firms (SIZE), firms with a higher number of segments (SEGMENTS), firms with a 
larger number of consecutive years with goodwill impairment in prior years (YEARS_IMP), firms 
with less current  returns (RETURN) and lagged stock returns (RETURN_LAG).  





Panel B of Table 4 illustrates the results from estimating the ordered logistic regression 
when the dependent variable is GWI_FREQ, the frequency of goodwill impairment. Consistent 
with our prediction, we document significant and positive coefficients on UNION (coefficient = 
2.389; z-statistic = 2.475; p-value = 0.013) and UNION_IND (coefficient = 0.549; z-statistic = 
5.319; p-value = 0.000). These results indicate that managers of unionized firms tend to recognize 
goodwill impairment losses more frequently. Panel C illustrates the results when the dependent 
variable is GWI_LOSS, the amount of goodwill impairment. Again, in accordance with our 
prediction, we find significant and positive coefficients on both UNION (coefficient = 0.017; t-
statistic = 3.000; p-value = 0.003) and UNION_IND (coefficient = 0.002; t-statistic = 4.872; p-
value = 0.000). These findings indicate that managers facing strong unions tend to recognize larger 
goodwill impairment losses compared to those with weak unions.  
4.3. Addressing Concerns on Endogeneity and Correlated Omitted Variables 
There is a concern that our findings may be affected by some unobservable firm 
characteristics that influence both labor unions and goodwill impairment. Prior research on labor 
unions suggests that unionization may be an endogenous process since unions self-select to 
organize in more established firms (e.g., Chyz 2013; Chung et al. 2016; Hamm et al. 2018; Chen 
et al. 2019). Thus, more mature firms are more likely to have organized labor (e.g., Chung et al 
2016; Hamm et al. 2018) and at the same time, due to their smaller growth opportunities, they may 
need to recognize goodwill impairment, leading to the positive relation between labor unions and 
goodwill impairment. To address this endogeneity concern and a potential correlated omitted 
variables problem, we perform the following three tests. 




First, to mitigate the above concern, that more mature firms or firms with less growth 
opportunities may drive our results, we directly examine whether our results—the positive 
relations between labor unions and goodwill impairment—are affected by firm maturity and 
growth potentials. To proxy for firm maturity and growth potentials, we use firm age and market-
to-book ratio, respectively. If the above concern is valid, we will find that our results exist only in 
the sub-sample of old firms and the sub-sample of firms with lower market-to-book ratios. To test, 
we first divide our sample into two sub-samples according to the medians of firm age and market-
to-book ratios and estimate our model to each set of matched sub-samples (by year, industry, and 
size). Results are illustrated in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Panel A of Table 5 exhibits the results when using UNION as a measure of labor unions. 
We find that the coefficients on UNION are significantly positive for all sub-samples except when 
the dependent variable is GWI_FREQ and our model is estimated in the sub-sample of firms with 
low growth opportunities. The seemingly unrelated regressions show that there is no statistical 
difference in the coefficients on UNION between the two sub-samples when either firm age or 
growth opportunities is used as a partitioning variable. Panel B reports the results when using 
UNION_IND instead of UNION. We also find that all the coefficients on UNION_IND are 
significantly positive for all sub-samples. Again, seemingly unrelated regressions confirm the 
same result that there is no significant difference in the coefficients on UNION_IND between the 
two sub-samples. In sum, these results alleviate the concern that our findings are driven by the 
endogenous relation between labor union and certain firm characteristics such as firm age and 
growth potential. 




As an additional robustness check to mitigate the endogeneity concern, we also perform a 
two-stage least squares analysis. Following Chung et al. (2016) and Chen et al. (2019), we use the 
percentage of female employees (FEMALE) in a firm’s industry as an instrumental variable.3 The 
extant literature on labor economics suggests that a firm with a higher ratio of female employees 
is less likely to unionize and, even if it does, its unions tend to be weaker. Thus, we predict a 
negative relationship between FEMALE and UNION (UNION_IND) in our sample. Meanwhile, 
there is no reason to suggest that there is a positive link between the percentage of female 
employees and a firm’s goodwill impairment decisions. Thus, we believe that the ratio of female 
employees is a good instrumental variable in our research setting. 
In the first stage, we regress UNION (UNION_IND) on FEMALE and all other explanatory 
variables in our model, including industry and year indicator variables. Results are reported in 
Panel A of Table 6. As expected, we document significantly negative coefficients on FEMALE for 
both measures of labor unions in the first stage regressions, consistent with prior studies showing 
that firms with more female employees are less likely to have strong labor unions. In the second 
stage, we include the fitted values of UNION (UNION_IND) from the first stage and include it as 
an independent variable. Results are reported in Panel B of Table 6. We find that when the 
dependent variable is GWI, the likelihood of goodwill impairment, the coefficients on the fitted 
values for both UNION and UNION_IND are still significantly positive, consistent with our main 
findings reported in Table 4. We also document that the magnitudes of the coefficients on both 
UNION and UNION_IND in this analysis are even larger than those on the corresponding 
coefficients in Table 4. We find similar results when the dependent variable is either GWI_FREQ 
or GWI_LOSS. These results are reported in Panel C and Panel D, respectively. 
 




[Insert Table 6 about here] 
In sum, our results still hold after addressing the endogeneity concern using two-stage least 
squares regressions: that managers facing strong unions are more likely to recognize goodwill 
impairment and when they do, they recognize goodwill impairment losses more frequently and to 
a larger extent.  
4.3.3. Results based on non-unionized firms in highly unionized industries 
 As another identification strategy, like that of Aobdia and Cheng (2018), we compare our 
goodwill impairment measures of unionized firms and non-unionized firms in highly unionized 
industries. We believe that this identification strategy can be effective since non‐unionized firms 
operating in highly unionized industries is a powerful within industry control. We define “highly 
unionized industries” as those with unionization rates higher than the yearly median of the 
industry-level unionization rate. Within a sample of firms in these industries, unionized firms are 
those whose employees are unionized or represented by a collective agreement while non-
unionized firms are those firms whose employees are not unionized nor represented by a collective 
agreement in a specific year.  
Table 7 shows that the sample size for unionized (non-unionized) firms in highly unionized 
industries is 2,275 (1,657) firm-year observations. First, when we compare GWI, the likelihood of 
goodwill impairment between the two groups, we find the mean of GWI is significantly higher for 
the unionized group (0.164 vs. 0.104) and the difference is significant at the 1% level. The 
difference also seems economically significant because the likelihood of goodwill impairment is 
at least 50% higher for unionized firms compared to non-unionized firms. Further, we find that 
GWI_FREQ, the frequency of goodwill impairment, is also higher for unionized firms than for 




is also statistically and economically significant. Lastly, GWI_LOSS, the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment loss, is also much higher for unionized firms compared to non-unionized firms (0.005 
vs. 0.002). The difference is also economically meaningful since the magnitude in unionized firms 
is more than twice as large as in non-unionized firms. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In sum, consistent with our main results, we document that the likelihood, frequency, and 
magnitude of goodwill impairment are higher for a group of unionized firms than for a group of 
non-unionized firms in highly unionized industries.  
5. Additional Analyses and Sensitivity Tests 
5.1. Cross-Sectional Variations in Managers’ Goodwill Impairment Decisions 
The literature on labor unions documents that managers use various accounting and non-
accounting strategies to gain bargaining power in labor negotiations. For instance, to maintain 
bargaining power, managers are motivated to hold lower levels of cash balances (Klasa, Maxwell, 
and Ortiz-Molina 2009) and higher levels of inventory (Hamm, Jung, Lee, and Yang 2020), 
maintain higher leverage (Matsa 2010), and report strategically (Bova 2013; Chung, Lee, Lee, and 
Sohn 2016; Hamm, Jung, and Lee 2018). Obviously, managers make the cost/benefit trade-off in 
using goodwill impairment recognition strategies compared with other potential tools to increase 
their bargaining strength with labor unions. Since goodwill impairment recognition is one of 
accounting strategies used against labor unions, we examine how non-accounting strategies 
documented in the literature affect managers’ decision on goodwill impairment recognition. 
Specifically, we examine how managers’ goodwill impairment decisions are affected by their cash 
holdings, inventory holdings, and leverage when facing strong labor unions. We predict that 




accounting strategies is less effective, for example, when cash holdings are higher, inventory 
holdings are lower, and leverage is lower.  
In Panel A of Table 8, we report the results of estimating the effect of cash holdings on the 
relations between labor unions and goodwill impairment variables. To test, we run our main 
regression on matched sub-samples (by year, industry, and size) after splitting the sample into two 
groups according to the sample median of cash holdings—high and low cash holdings groups. We 
document that the positive effect of labor unions on our goodwill impairment variables is stronger 
when cash holdings are higher. These results suggest that when managers’ strategy to reduce cash 
holdings to gain more bargaining power is not effective, they are more likely to rely on goodwill 
impairment options.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
In Panel B, we report the results of examining how managers’ inventory stockpiling to 
weaken labor unions’ strike threats affects our results. Hamm et al. (2020) document that when 
labor unions are strong, managers’ inventory stockpiling incentives are stronger since stockpiling 
can effectively weaken unions’ strikes. Similar to the analysis used in Panel A, we run our 
regression on matched sub-samples (by industry, year, and size) after dividing our sample into two 
sub-samples according to the median of inventory holdings. We find that the positive effect of 
unions on goodwill impairment variables is more pronounced for firms with lower inventory 
levels. Again, these results suggest that managers rely on goodwill impairment recognition to a 
larger extent when the inventory stockpiling option is not viable.  
In Panel C, we examine leverage as an alternative bargaining tool against labor unions 
based on prior studies’ findings that managers facing strong unions tend to increase leverage (e.g., 




sample median, again suggesting that goodwill impairment recognition can be used as a bargaining 
tool when using debt is not effective.   
Overall, these results indicate that managers compare various strategies, both accounting 
and non-accounting, to weaken labor unions’ bargaining power. In our setting, they rely on 
goodwill impairment recognition to a larger extent when non-accounting strategies are not feasible. 
5.2. Robustness Tests 
5.2.1. The effect of financial crisis period on the results 
To check the sensitivity of our results to the 2008 global financial crisis, we split our sample 
into two sub-periods: financial crisis period (2008-2009, inclusive) versus non-crisis period (2007, 
2010-2016, inclusive). We choose 2008 and 2009 as financial crisis period because we observe 
that the number of goodwill impairments significantly increased in these two years (197 and 128 
goodwill impairments in 2008 and 2009, respectively). This test also allows us to examine how 
changes in macro-economic conditions impact the relations between labor unions and goodwill 
impairment decisions. Table 9 reports the results for both sub-periods. Panel A shows that when 
the dependent variable is either GWI, GWI_FREQ, or GWI_LOSS, the coefficients on UNION are 
significantly positive for both sub-periods and show no significant difference in the magnitude of 
the coefficients between the two sub-periods. These results suggest that the positive relations 
between labor unions and goodwill impairment decisions are not affected by the inclusion of 
observations in the global financial crisis in our sample. In Panel B, we obtain similar results when 
UNION_IND is used instead of UNION.  
 [Insert Table 9 about here] 




We further examine the effect of the Accounting Standard Update (ASU) 2011-08 on our 
findings. ASU 2011-08 provides managers with more accounting discretions to test goodwill 
impairments and is effective for goodwill impairment tests in fiscal years starting after December 
15, 2011. We investigate whether our results are driven by the increased accounting discretion 
after the ASU 2011-08.  We split our sample into sub-periods based on ASU 2011-08 and estimate 
our main regressions in both sub-periods. The post-ASU 2011-08 sample consists of 4,010 
observations from 2012 to 2016 with 447 goodwill impairments. Table 10 presents the results from 
estimating our model for both pre and post ASU-2011-08 sub-samples. Results in Panel A illustrate 
that the coefficients on UNION are significantly positive in both pre- and post- ASU-2011-08 
samples. The seemingly unrelated regressions also show that the coefficients on UNION between 
pre- and post-periods are not statistically different. Panel B reports similar findings when using 
UNION_IND instead of UNION. In sum, these results suggest that the positive relations between 
labor unions and goodwill impairment exist before and after ASU 2011-08, mitigating the concern 
that our results are driven by observations after ASU 2011-08.4  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
5.2.3. The relation between labor unions and goodwill impairment without market 
indications of goodwill impairment 
In this section, we further examine whether our results on the relationship between labor 
unions and goodwill impairment are due to managers’ intentional recognition of goodwill 
impairment to reduce reported earnings and thus increase bargaining power against labor unions. 
Specifically, we test whether the positive links between labor unions and goodwill impairment are 
 
4 We explore the relations between labor unions and goodwill impairment by using another measure of union strength. 
We obtain data on strikes from the Major Work Stoppages reports released by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
These reports provide data on stoppages that involve 1,000 or more workers. We find only twenty-two strikes in 
thirteen firms, however, which limits our ability to draw conclusions on the relations between goodwill impairment 




stronger when managers should not recognize goodwill impairment. We test this prediction in a 
sample of firms without market indications of goodwill impairment. Following Beatty and Weber 
(2006), we identify a firm as having no market indications of goodwill impairment if the difference 
between market value and book value of equity is greater than their recorded goodwill. Based on 
this measure, we form a sub-sample of firm-years without market indications of goodwill 
impairment and estimate our main model. Results are reported in Table 11. We document that 
labor unions have significant and positive relations with all goodwill impairment measures, 
suggesting that our main results exist in this sub-sample. These findings further indicate that 
managers of unionized firms recognize goodwill impairment to reduce reported earnings for better 
bargaining power even when market indications of goodwill impairment say that goodwill should 
not be impaired. 
In non-tabulated tests, we document that union strength is not significantly related to 
goodwill impairment measures in the sub-sample of firms with market indications of goodwill 
impairment. The result suggests that when goodwill is likely to be impaired, managers are more 
likely to recognize goodwill impairment regardless of the existence and strength of unions. As an 
alternative proxy for market indications of goodwill impairment, we employ Ramanna and Watts 
(2012)’s definition and find that the results are qualitatively similar.5 Overall, the results in Table 
11 indicate that the positive relations between labor unions and goodwill impairment that we 
document are due to managers’ intentional recognition of goodwill impairment to weaken labor 
unions’ bargaining power.  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
 
5 Ramanna and Watts (2012) identify firms with market indications of goodwill impairment as firms with a positive 





Prior research suggests several determinants of goodwill impairment that are mostly related 
to managerial incentives or financial stakeholders’ demands. Our focus is on the hitherto mostly 
ignored impact of unionization on the likelihood, frequency, and extent that managers recognize 
goodwill impairments. Prior literature also suggests that managers strategically react to unions’ 
rent-seeking activities by engaging in income-decreasing accounting strategies. Therefore, we 
posit a significantly positive relationship between union strength and goodwill impairment 
incidence. We also predict that managers facing strong unions rely on goodwill impairment more 
frequently to lower reported earnings, and when managers recognize goodwill impairment, the 
amount of impairment losses is larger for unionized firms.  
We use three measures for goodwill impairment—an indicator variable to capture the 
likelihood of goodwill impairment loss, an ordinal variable to proxy for the frequency of goodwill 
impairment, and a continuous variable to capture the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses. 
We employ two proxies for labor unions—an indicator variable to capture the existence and 
strength of unions in a firm, computed by multiplying industry-level unionization rates by firm-
level labor intensity. The results are in line with our hypotheses that labor unions are positively 
linked to the likelihood, frequency, and amount of goodwill impairment. Our results are robust to 
various robustness tests to address the endogeneity concern and to mitigate concerns on the effects 
of the global financial crisis, ASU 2011-08, and market indications of goodwill impairment.  
By finding evidence that labor unions are positively related to goodwill impairment 
decisions, we contribute to the accounting literature that investigates the impact of labor 
considerations on manager’s accounting choices. Our results indicate that managers of unionized 




accounting standard to avoid labor unions’ profit-sharing demands. While most prior research, 
such as Bova (2013), examines the impact of labor unions on earnings levels, we examine a 
specific accounting choice—goodwill impairment to reduce overall earnings level for firms 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources  
Variables Description Source 
𝐺𝑊𝐼 Indicator variable equals 1 if a firm recognizes a goodwill 
impairment loss (GDWLIP). 
Compustat 
𝐺𝑊𝐼_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄 Ordinal variable equal to the cumulative number of times a 
firm records a goodwill impairment loss.  
Compustat 
𝐺𝑊𝐼_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 (-1) × goodwill impairment loss scaled by lagged total assets 
(GDWLIP/AT) 
Compustat 
𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁 Industry-based union measure calculated by multiplying the 
industry-level union rates by firm-level labor intensity 
(EMP/AT) following Hilary (2006). 
Unionstats/ 
Compustat  
𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐼𝑁𝐷 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the employees of a firm has a 
union or experiences a collective bargaining agreement 
following Hamm et al. (2018). 
10-Ks 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets 
(IB/AT). 
Compustat 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 The natural log of total assets (AT). Compustat 
𝑀𝑇𝐵 Market value divided by book value (CSHO ×  PRCC_F / 
CEQ). 
Compustat 
𝐺𝑊/𝑇𝐴 Goodwill divided by total assets (GDWL /AT). Compustat 
𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 Number of segments (BUSSEG / OPSEG).  Compustat 
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆. 𝐼𝑀𝑃 Number of consecutive years with goodwill impairment losses 
(GDWLIP) before the current year, following Glaum et al. 
(2018). 
Compustat 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 Standard deviation of monthly market returns. CRSP 
𝐿𝐸𝑉 Total liabilities divided by total assets (LT/AT). Compustat 
𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇 Indicator variable equal 1 if a firm is audited by a Big 4 
auditing firm (AU = 4, 5, 6, or 7). 
Compustat 
𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐺 Number of analysts following a firm. I/B/E/S 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇. 𝑂𝑊𝑁 Proportion of equity shares held by institutional owners.  TR 13f-s34  
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 CEO’s variable income (tdc2 - salary) divided by total income 
(tdc2). 
Execucomp 
TENURE Number of years the CEO is in office. Execucomp 
SMOOTH Indicator variable equals 1 if income (IB) is positive and the 
change in income is greater than the median among firms 
with a positive change in income, following Glaum et al. 
(2018). 
Compustat 
BATH Indicator variable equals 1 if income (IB) is negative and the 
change in income is less than the median among those firms 
with a negative change in income, following Glaum et al. 
(2018). 
Compustat 
RETURN Annual stock return for firm. CRSP 
RETURN_LAG One-year lagged annual stock return.  CRSP 
FEMALE Percentage of female employees. U.S. BLS 
UNION_STATE State-based union measure calculated by multiplying the state-
level union rates by firm-level labor intensity (EMP/ AT) 
following Hamm et al. (2018). 
Unionstats/ 
Compustat  
AGE Natural log of a firm’s age since it appeared in CRSP. CRSP 
CASH_HOLDING Cash minus debt in current liabilities (CH - DLC). Compustat 




Table 1: Sample Distribution  
Panel A: Distribution by Year 
  Full Sample  Percent  Impairment Sample  Percent  
 2007 762  9.55%  47   4.85%  
 2008 798  10.00%  197  20.25%  
 2009 801  10.04%  128  13.16%  
 2010 807  10.11%  67    6.89%  
 2011 801  10.04%  87    8.94%  
 2012 799  10.01%  92    9.46%  
 2013 804  10.08%  80    8.22%  
 2014 797  9.99%  80    8.22%  
 2015 806  10.10%  96    9.87%  
 2016 804  10.08%  99  10.17%  
 Total 7,979  100.00%  973  100.00%  
 
Panel B: Distribution by Industry  








 11  Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting  9  0 
 21  Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction  205  28 
 22  Utilities  60  10 
 23  Construction  165  30 
 31-33  Manufacturing  4,031  507 
 42  Wholesale Trade  339  49 
 44-45  Retail Trade  368  49 
 48-49  Transportation and Warehousing  227  19 
 51  Information  629  59 
 52  Finance and Insurance  643  70 
 53  Real Estate and Rental and Leasing  244  20 
 54  Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services  392  31 
 56  Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services 
 217  35 
 61  Educational Services  58  18 
 62  Health Care and Social Assistance  156  14 
 71  Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation  30  7 
 72  Accommodation and Food Services  156  19 
 81  Other Services (except Public Administration)  50  8 






Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  

































Goodwill Impairment                               
  GWI 7,979  0.122  0.000  0.327  973  1.000  1.000  0.000  7,006  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  -  0.000 
  GWI_FREQ 7,979  0.258  0.000  0.850  973  2.111  2.000  1.419  7,006  0.000  0.000  0.000  2.113  0.000  0.000 
  GWI_LOSS 7,979  0.004  0.000  0.019  973  0.034  0.012  0.043  7,006  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.034  0.000  0.000 
Labor Union                              
  UNION 7,954  0.032  0.016  0.044  970  0.038  0.020  0.049  6,984  0.031  0.015  0.043  0.006  0.000  0.000 
  UNION_IND 7,979  0.363  0.000  0.481  973  0.521  1.000  0.500  7,006  0.340  0.000  0.474  0.181  0.000  0.000 
Firm-level control variables                              
  ROA 7,979  0.051  0.054  0.081  973  -0.012  0.013  0.111  7,006  0.060  0.057  0.072  -0.073  0.000  0.000 
  SIZE 7,979  7.841  7.686  1.692  973  8.003  7.836  1.637  7,006  7.819  7.664  1.698  0.191  0.001  0.001 
  MTB 7,979  3.202  2.352  4.461  973  2.321  1.658  3.642  7,006  3.324  2.455  4.550  -1.005  0.000  0.000 
  GW/TA 7,979  0.159  0.120  0.149  973  0.157  0.133  0.136  7,006  0.159  0.118  0.151  -0.002  0.759  0.282 
  SEGMENTS 7,979  2.549  2.000  1.545  973  3.002  3.000  1.646  7,006  2.486  2.000  1.520  0.522  0.000  0.000 
  YEARS_IMP 7,979  0.168  0.000  0.523  973  0.521  0.000  0.897  7,006  0.119  0.000  0.425  0.401  0.000  0.000 
  RISK 7,979  0.098  0.084  0.054  973  0.124  0.098  0.076  7,006  0.095  0.083  0.049  0.029  0.000  0.000 
Debt Contracting                              
  LEVERAGE 7,979  0.530  0.528  0.229  973  0.563  0.561  0.212  7,006  0.526  0.523  0.231  0.038  0.000  0.000 
Governance and Monitoring                              
  AUDIT 7,979  0.928  1.000  0.259  973  0.948  1.000  0.223  7,006  0.925  1.000  0.263  0.022  0.011  0.011 
  FOLLOW 7,979  11.043  9.250  7.461  973  10.467  8.750  7.078  7,006  11.123  9.333  7.509  -0.650  0.010  0.030 
  INST_OWN 7,979  0.828  0.854  0.163  973  0.820  0.842  0.155  7,006  0.829  0.856  0.164  -0.009  0.114  0.011 
Managerial/Firm Incentives                               
  COMP 7,979  0.758  0.823  0.204  973  0.729  0.790  0.213  7,006  0.762  0.826  0.202  -0.033  0.000  0.000 
  TENURE 7,979  8.175  6.324  7.194  973  7.289  5.144  6.973  7,006  8.298  6.500  7.216  -1.004  0.000  0.000 
  SMOOTH 7,979  0.156  0.000  0.363  973  0.090  0.000  0.287  7,006  0.165  0.000  0.372  -0.075  0.000  0.000 
  BATH 7,979  0.074  0.000  0.261  973  0.301  0.000  0.459  7,006  0.042  0.000  0.201  0.259  0.000  0.000 
Economic Determinants                              
  RETURN 7,979  0.129  0.110  0.373  973  0.029  0.026  0.405  7,006  0.143  0.120  0.366  -0.113  0.000  0.000 
  RETURN_LAG 7,979  0.134  0.115  0.377  973  -0.030  -0.055  0.360  7,006  0.156  0.135  0.373  -0.186  0.000  0.000 
Notes: This panel reports the simple statistics of all research variables, mean differences between the impairment and non-impairment groups, and p-values corresponding to tests for differences 






Table 3: Spearman and Pearson Correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) GWI  0.997*** 0.997*** 0.058*** 0.124*** 0.012 0.108*** 0.236*** 0.058*** 0.029*** -0.022** -0.029*** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.067*** 0.325*** 
(2) GWI_FREQ 0.813***  0.993*** 0.059*** 0.125*** 0.015 0.111 0.257*** 0.060*** 0.030*** -0.022** -0.027** -0.064*** -0.061*** -0.064*** 0.315*** 
(3) GWI_LOSS 0.588*** 0.387***  0.061*** 0.125*** 0.012 0.104*** 0.231*** 0.055*** 0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.071*** -0.061*** -0.071*** 0.353*** 
(4) UNION 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.032***  0.482*** 0.117*** 0.076*** 0.052*** -0.009 -0.054*** -0.143*** -0.052*** -0.156*** 0.002 0.001 -0.009 
(5) UNION_IND 0.123*** 0.115*** 0.073*** 0.361***  0.125*** 0.199*** 0.088*** 0.198*** 0.051*** -0.029*** -0.053*** -0.032*** -0.025*** -0.013 -0.011 
(6) GW/TA -0.003 0.005 -0.010 0.024** 0.086***  0.075*** 0.005 -0.025** 0.043*** 0.126*** 0.108*** 0.132*** -0.012 -0.078*** -0.075*** 
(7) SEGMENTS 0.109*** 0.118*** 0.013 0.035*** 0.177*** 0.025**  0.102*** 0.226*** 0.131*** 0.1135*** -0.089*** 0.132*** -0.065*** -0.058*** -0.028*** 
(8) YEARS_IMP 0.251*** 0.422*** 0.083*** 0.050*** 0.094*** 0.006 0.116***  0.053*** 0.012 -0.029*** -0.019*** -0.050*** -0.071*** 0.140*** 0.026** 
(9) LEVERAGE 0.053*** 0.060*** 0.005 0.029** 0.181*** -0.042*** 0.206*** 0.056***  0.197*** 0.185*** -0.002 0.182*** -0.103*** -0.083*** -0.010 
(10) AUDIT 0.028** 0.023** -0.010 -0.019* 0.052*** 0.038*** 0.132*** 0.014 0.190***  0.244*** 0.093*** 0.190*** -0.049*** -0.018 -0.024** 
(11) FOLLOW -0.029** -0.022** -0.059*** -0.114*** -0.053*** 0.076*** 0.120*** -0.024** 0.158*** 0.217***  0.080*** 0.457*** -0.041*** -0.052*** -0.090*** 
(12) INST_OWN -0.018 0.002 -0.018* -0.059*** -0.040*** 0.115*** -0.055*** -0.002 0.027** 0.103*** 0.060***  0.125*** -0.035*** 0.035*** -0.017 
(13) COMP -0.053*** -0.025** -0.100*** -0.079*** 0.014 0.117*** 0.155*** -0.015 0.195*** 0.197*** 0.365*** 0.196***  0.043*** 0.026** -0.135*** 
(14) TENURE -0.046*** -0.051*** -0.030*** 0.034*** -0.037*** -0.023** -0.048*** -0.056*** -0.129*** -0.083*** -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.088***  -0.024** -0.042*** 
(15) SMOOTH -0.068*** -0.028*** -0.082*** 0.019* -0.014 -0.083*** -0.055*** 0.119*** -0.077*** -0.017 -0.043*** 0.026** 0.043*** -0.022**  -0.121*** 
(16) BATH 0.324*** 0.198*** 0.520*** -0.003 0.010 -0.064*** -0.029** 0.023** -0.013 -0.027** -0.083*** -0.024** -0.152*** -0.018* -0.121***  
Notes: This table presents the correlation matrix for selected variables for the full sample. Spearman and Pearson correlations are presented above and below the diagonal, respectively. All 









Table 4: Relation between Labor Unions and Goodwill Impairment 
 
Panel A: Labor Unions and the Likelihood of Goodwill Impairment 
 Variable Name  UNION  UNION_IND  
   Labor union 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 










 Firm-Level Control Variables      
   ROA 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










   SIZE 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










   MTB 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










   GW/TA 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










   SEGMENTS 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










   YEARS_IMP 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










   RISK 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










 Debt Contracting      
   LEVERAGE 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










 Governance and Monitoring      
   AUDIT 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










   FOLLOW 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










   INST_OWN 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  













 Managerial/Firm Incentives       
   COMP 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










   TENURE 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










   SMOOTH 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










   BATH 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










 Economic Determinants      
   RETURN 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










   RETURN_LAG 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










       
 Intercept  Yes  Yes  
 Year and industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  
 Observations  7,945  7,960  
 Pseudo R-squared  0.226  0.233  
 
Panel B: Labor Unions and the Frequency of Goodwill Impairment Loss Recognition 
 Variable Name  UNION  UNION_IND  
 Labor Union      
     Labor union 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  










       
 Intercept and controls  Yes  Yes  
 Year and industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  
 Observations  7,954  7,979  
 Pseudo R-squared  0.153  0.163  
 
Panel C: Labor Unions and the Magnitude of Goodwill Impairment Losses 
 Variable Name  UNION  UNION_IND  
 Labor Union      
   Labor Union 
    Coefficient 
    t-statistic  










       
 Intercept and controls  Yes  Yes  




 Observations  7,954  7,979  
 Adj. R-squared  0.336  0.341  
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating our model. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1%. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
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Table 5: The Effect of Firm Characteristics on the Relation between Labor Unions and Goodwill Impairment 
 
Panel A: The Relationship between UNION and Goodwill Impairment 
 Firm Age  Growth Opportunities 
 GWI  GWI_FREQ  GWI_LOSS  GWI  GWI_FREQ  GWI_LOSS 
 Low High  Low High  Low High  Low High  Low High  Low High 
UNION 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 

















































Intercept and controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
p-value for the difference  0.737  0.924  0.512  0.911  0.444  0.553 
 
Panel B: The Relationship between UNION_IND and Goodwill Impairment 
 Firm Age  Growth Opportunities 
 GWI  GWI_FREQ  GWI_LOSS  GWI  GWI_FREQ  GWI_LOSS 
 Low High  Low High  Low High  Low High  Low High  Low High 
UNION_IND 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 

















































Intercept and controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
p-value for the difference  0.182  0.224  0.341  0.592  0.813  0.715 
Notes: This table reports the results of the subsample analysis by AGE, and MTB. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Standard errors 










Table 6: The Results of the Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions 
 
Panel A: First-Stage Regression 
 Variable Name  UNION  UNION_IND  
   FEMALE 
    Coefficient 
    t-statistic 










 Intercept and controls  Yes  Yes  
 Year and industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  
 Observations  7,648  7,662  
 Adj. (Pseudo) R-squared  0.362  (0.263)  
 
Panel B: Second-Stage Regression (Relation between Likelihood of Goodwill Impairment and Labor Unions) 
 Variable Name  UNION  UNION_IND  
 UNION (Fitted Value) 
    Coefficient 
   z-statistic 








 UNION_IND (Fitted Value) 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 








 Intercept and controls  Yes  Yes  
 Year and industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  
 Observations  7,648  7,662  
 Adj. (Pseudo) R-squared  0.098  0.205  
 
Panel C: Second-Stage Regression (Relation between Labor Unions and Frequency of Goodwill Impairment) 
 Variable Name  UNION  UNION_IND  
 UNION (Fitted Value) 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 





   
 UNION_IND (Fitted Value) 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 
    p-value 





 Intercept and controls  Yes  Yes  
 Year and industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  
 Observations  7,648  7,662  
 Adj. R-squared  0.192  0.242  
 
Panel D: Second-Stage Regression (Relation between Labor Unions and Magnitude of Goodwill Impairment) 
 Variable Name  UNION  UNION_IND  
 UNION (Fitted Value) 
    Coefficient 
    t-statistic 








 UNION_IND (Fitted Value) 
    Coefficient 
    t-statistic 








 Intercept and controls   Yes  Yes  
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 Year and industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  
 Observations  7,648  7,662  
 Adj. R-squared  0.219  0.329  
Notes: This panel reports the results of the 2SLS regressions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1%. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Stage 1  
𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑊/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆_𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽10𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑆𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐵𝐴𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽17𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽18𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁_𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Stage 2 
𝐺𝑊𝐼 (𝐺𝑊𝐼_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄 𝑜𝑟 𝐺𝑊𝐼_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡(𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑊/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆_𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽10𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽13𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑆𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡





Table 7: Unionized Firms versus Non-Unionized Firms in Highly Unionized Industries 





















GWI 2,275  0.164  0.370  1,657  0.104  0.306  0.059  0.000  0.000 
GWI_FREQ 2,275  0.371  1.059  1,657  0.232  0.836  0.138  0.000  0.000 
GWI_LOSS 2, 275  0.005  0.019  1, 657  0.003  0.017  0.002  0.002  0.000 
Notes: This table reports the simple statistics of GWI, GWI_FREQ, and GWLOSS for unionized and non-unionized firms in unionized industries, mean 
differences between the unionized and non-unionized firms, and p-values corresponding to tests for differences in means and medians based on the t-test and 


















Table 8: Cross-sectional variations in the Relation between Labor Unions and Goodwill 
Impairment 
Panel A: The Effect of Cash Holding on the Relation between Labor Unions and Goodwill Impairment 
 GWI  GWI_FREQ  GWI_LOSS 
 Low  High  Low  High  Low  High 
UNION 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 

























Intercept and controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
p-value for the difference  0.049  0.048  0.001 
 
Panel B: The Effect of Inventory Holdings on the Relation between Labor Unions and Goodwill Impairment 
 GWI  GWI_FREQ  GWI_LOSS 
 Low  High  Low  High  Low  High 
UNION 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 

























Intercept and controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
p-value for the difference  0.011  0.038  0.029 
 
Panel C: The Effect of Leverage on the Relation between Labor Unions and Goodwill Impairment 
 GWI  GWI_FREQ  GWI_LOSS 
 Low  High  Low  High  Low  High 
UNION 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 




























Intercept and controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
p-value for the difference  0.014  0.004  0.029 
Notes: This table reports the results of the subsample analysis by CASH_HOLDING, INVENTORY, AND LEV. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). 











Table 9: The Impact of Financial Crisis on the Relation between Labor Unions and Goodwill 
Impairment 
Panel A: The Relationship between UNION and Goodwill Impairment 














    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 

























Intercept and controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
p-value for the difference  0.444  0.734  0.356 
 
Panel B: The Relationship between UNION_IND and Goodwill Impairment 














    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 

























Intercept and controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
p-value for the difference  0.246  0.4929  0.172 
Notes: This table reports the results of the subsample analysis by financial crisis period. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). All variables are defined 
















Table 10: The Impact of ASU 2011-08 on the Relation between Labor Unions and Goodwill 
Impairment 
Panel A: Relationship between UNION and Goodwill Impairment 
 GWI  GWI_FREQ  GWI_LOSS 
 Pre  Post  Pre  Post  Pre  Post 
UNION 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 

























Intercept and controls   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
p-value for the difference  0.281  0.180  0.913 
 
Panel B: The Relationship between UNION_IND and Goodwill Impairment 
 GWI  GWI_FREQ  GWI_LOSS 
 Pre  Post  Pre  Post  Pre  Post 
UNION_IND 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic 

























Intercept and controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
p-value for the difference  0.968  0.850  0. 395 
Notes: This table reports the results of the subsample analysis by ASU 2011-08. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). All variables are defined 


















Table 11: The Relation between Goodwill Impairment and Labor Unions in the Absence of 
Market Indications of Goodwill Impairment 
Panel A: Relationship between UNION and Goodwill Impairment 
Variable Name GWI  GWI_FREQ  GWI_LOSS 
  UNION 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  













Intercept and controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 6,599  6,627  6,627 
Pseudo (Adj.) R-squared  0.1865  0.1360  (0.265) 
 
Panel B: The Relationship between UNION_IND and Goodwill Impairment 
Variable Name GWI  GWI_FREQ  GWI_LOSS 
  UNION 
    Coefficient 
    z-statistic  













      
Intercept and controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 6,611  6,647  6,647 
Pseudo (Adj.) R-squared 0.1915  0.1392  (0.265) 
Notes: This table reports the results when there are no market indications of goodwill impairment. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). All variables 
















FIGURE 1  
Number and Value of Mergers and Acquisitions in the United States of America 
 
